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Abstract 
 
This paper presents a model of passenger air transport markets that generally 
focuses on three main groups of stakeholders: air travellers, airlines and airports. Air 
travellers’ choice of air transport services is modelled by a demand function 
considering product differentiation. Thus, demand for passenger air transport is not a 
fixed model-exogenous input parameter but is determined model-endogenously and 
depends on the supply of flights and their various characteristics. Competitive 
relationships are modelled as Cournot quantity competition with heterogeneous 
products. Airlines and airports only have incomplete information about the nature of 
each other, which is then updated by a dynamic learning process in each period. The 
model is of particular interest in evaluating business strategies on behalf of airlines 
and airports and for public institutions that wish to analyse various market scenarios 
and evaluate politico-economic actions. 
 
KEYWORDS: airline competition, game theory, nonlinear programming 
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1. Introduction 
 
In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in the modelling of competitive 
relationships within the passenger air transport markets. Aside from improvements in 
modelling techniques and the steadily increasing computational power of personal 
computers (an essential prerequisite to employ such models effectively in praxis), the 
key drivers of this trend were the growing importance of deregulated and thus more 
competitive passenger air transport markets and the rise of new business models in 
aviation. It is now more than 30 years since the US Airline Deregulation Act was 
approved by the US Congress (e.g., Goetz and Vowles, 2009) and more countries 
have followed in subsequent years. For example, deregulation began in Australia in 
the early 1980’s (e.g., Hooper, 1998) and in Europe in the late 1980’s (e.g., Ehmer et 
al., 2000). Prior to deregulation, national air transport markets were mainly 
monopolies, with only one national carrier or a very few regulated carriers serving 
their national air transport markets. International air travel was governed exclusively 
by strict bilateral national agreements. 
 
According to the competitive environment of passenger air transport markets, we 
differentiate between three classes of models: models of monopolistic competition, 
models of oligopolistic competition (but without extensive network optimisation 
capabilities and thus only applicable to some problems) and models of oligopolistic 
competition with extensive network optimisation capabilities, which are therefore 
applicable to a wide range of problems. 
 
The first class of models serves to optimise flight structures between airports and is 
largely applied to complex hub-&-spoke systems, where coordination costs tend to be 
high. Such models include extensive network optimisation capabilities, in order to 
produce feasible flight schedules as dictated by passenger demand, flight restrictions 
and capacity constraints. These models are usually applied under monopolistic 
conditions and examples of such models include Gordon (1974), Jacquemin (2006), 
Jeng (1987) and Miller (1963). Passenger demand is assumed to be fixed in most 
models and their objective is to optimise flight structures, in order to meet a certain 
demand. There are some models of monopolistic competition, without extensive 
network optimisation, that operate on simpler network structures. These models are 
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mainly used for specialised studies; for example, Berechman and Shy (1996) and 
Brueckner and Zhang (2001) compare flight frequency, fares and social welfare in 
point-to-point and hub-&-spoke networks. 
 
The second class of models comprises of models predominantly tailored to analyse a 
particular question in an oligopolistic market environment: they typically focus on 
point-to-point traffic and simple hub-&-spoke networks of low complexity, without 
considering special flight restrictions and capacity constraints. A popular is the 
analysis of market equilibrium and social welfare in deregulated and regulated 
markets. Examples include Douglas and Miller (1974), Panzar (1979, 1980), 
Schipper et al. (2003) and Zhang (1996). Further analysis comprises network 
competition, network invasion and entry deterrence. Pels (2009) considers point-to-
point and hub-&-spoke traffic, in order to analyse the effects of network competition 
between two airlines (with regards to the invading of each other’s network). 
Aguirregabiria and Ho (2009) model a dynamic game of airline competition, with a 
focus on entry deterrence in hub-&-spoke networks: they applied the theory of 
Markov’s perfect equilibrium, in order to find a solution. Zhang (1996) analyses 
fortress hubs in airline networks and the impact of local competition on social welfare 
in hub-&-spoke systems. Oum et al. (1995) compare the growing number of hub-&-
spoke systems in the USA and Canada after deregulation with point-to-point 
systems, which were popular before. 
 
The third class of model is associated with competitive relationships and includes 
extensive network optimisation capabilities; however, the members of this class still 
differ to some degree, in their ability to model market structures and complex network 
structures. It is thus sometimes difficult to decide whether a particular model belongs 
to class two or class three. Nevertheless, the ability to include competitive 
relationships between market actors and more flexible network structures enhance 
model practicality in a multitude of real-life problems. Models which focus more on 
(multi-) hub-&-spoke systems, with an exogenously-given passenger demand, are 
Dobson and Lederer (1993), Kanafani and Ghobrial (1985), Hansen (1990) and 
Hansen and Kanafani (1990). Takebayashi (2009) employ a bi-level approach, with 
demand and prices fixed and airlines controlling frequency and aircraft choice. 
Takebayashi and Kanafani (2005) employ a bi-level approach to model competition 
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between hub-&-spoke and point-to-point carriers: passenger demand is fixed, with 
airlines controlling fares and flight frequency. Hong and Harker (1992) apply a 
variational inequality approach to the proper pricing of capacity. Evans et al. (2008), 
Evans and Schäfer (2009) and Adler (2001, 2005) develop models of airline 
competition which are applicable to a wide range of different network structures and a 
number of competitors. 
 
Just how relevant is the feature of a model in allowing for arbitrary airline network 
structures? Hendricks et al. (1995) analyse network choice (hub-&-spoke vs. point-to-
point, not just air transport markets) of a monopoly carrier and highlight that this 
choice depends on the degree of economics of density in an origin-destination (O-D) 
market. In their enhanced model, they analyse the deterrence effect of a hub-&-
spoke network on small-scale entry (Hendricks et al., 1997) and duopolistic 
competition between two large carriers, who are not restricted in their choice of 
networks (Hendricks et al., 1999). Hendricks et al. reason that hub-&-spoke carriers 
enjoy an advantage over point-to-point carriers as a result of their higher productivity: 
they can attain economies of density more easily than point-to-point carriers. Thus, 
they conclude, the number of point-to-point carriers tend to decrease over time. 
 
However, in airline markets, there is growing empirical and theoretical evidence that 
a hub-&-spoke network structure may not always be optimal and that the impact of 
low-cost carriers, which mainly rely on the point-to-point concept, is significant: they 
invade the networks of traditional carriers that focus on the hub-&-spoke system 
(e.g., Dennis, 2007; Gillen and Morrison, 2005; Mason, 2001; Mason and Alamdari, 
2007; Pels et al., 2000; Vowles, 2001). 
 
In this paper we present a model of passenger air transport markets that can handle 
any number of airlines and airports and complex network structures. Demand for 
passenger air transport is not a fixed model-exogenous input parameter but is 
determined model-endogenously and therefore depends on, amongst other factors, 
the supply of flights and their various characteristics. Competitive relationships 
between airlines and airports are modelled on a game-theoretic framework and there 
are three major innovations, when compared to existing approaches: the method of 
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modelling air passenger demand, the handling of incomplete information and learning 
and how market equilibrium is computed. 
 
The decision problems of each airline and airport are modelled as a nonlinear 
programme and game theory is employed to model competitive relationships. 
Incomplete information and dynamic learning play a central role in this model; 
however, this makes the model computationally difficult to handle. Thus, the concepts 
of a so-called empirical reaction function and market entry/exit probability function are 
presented: each competitor’s marginal behaviour is learned on the basis of a 
smoother version of their past moves and serves as input for the empirical reaction 
function to forecast future actions. The market entry/exit probability function 
describes the relationship between the profitability of a particular market and the 
probability of market entry and exit. Furthermore, the modelling approach employed 
in this paper means a partial departure from assuming perfect rational individuals 
with unlimited computing abilities towards behaviour which is more likely to be based 
on observed past actions of opponents. 
 
One of the central objectives of the model is to explain the dynamic developments of 
air transport markets and their competitive forces. In this context, incomplete 
information and learning play a critical role, with regards to the profitability of 
deterrence and entry strategies. 
 
The outline of this paper is as follows: chapter two serves as a brief introduction to 
the foundations of game theory and discrete choice, as employed in the model. 
Chapter three subsequently describes the model in detail. Finally, the paper closes 
with a model discussion and a summary of the results. 
 
2. Methodical background 
 
2.1 Game theory 
 
Game theory refers to the modelling of interactive decision-making. A game-theoretic 
model comprises a finite set of  players, for each player i a nonempty action set  N iA
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with elements  and a preference relation  on the set of action profiles ia i  j j Na a  . 
An action profile a  represents an outcome and the set of outcomes and action 
profiles, respectively, is denoted j N jA A 

. Here, we can see how a strategic game 
differs from a decision problem: each player does not only care about his own actions 
but also those taken by the other players. Thus, the preference relation  of each 
player i is defined, with regards to the set of action profiles  rather than his action 
set  (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994, p.11). 
i
iA
 
The most popular solution concept employed in game theory is that of Nash 
equilibrium (Nash, 1950). A Nash equilibrium can briefly be described as an action 
profile in which each player’s action is a best response, given the actions of the other 
players, and thus no player can profitably deviate. More formally, a Nash equilibrium 
of a strategic game   , ,iN A  Ai  is a profile a   of actions with the property that 
for every player  we have iN    ,i ia,i ia a   i a  for all ia Ai . Here,  describes 
an action profile exclusive of the action of player i: each player is assumed to have 
complete information about the relevant characteristics of the strategic game and 
thus acts rationally. However, the concept of a Nash equilibrium only describes a 
steady state of the play of a strategic game and does not say anything about how this 
steady state has been reached (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994, pp.14). 
ia
 
In a repeated game, the so-called stage game is played in each of the periods 
 0,1,t  . The number of periods can take any finite number or be infinite. A 
player’s choice in the stage game is denoted as an ‘action’, whilst their behaviour in 
the repeated game is termed a ‘strategy’. In this paper, we look at repeated games of 
perfect monitoring; i.e. that all players observe the chosen action profile at the end of 
each period (Mailath and Samuelson, 2006, pp.15). In every period, the repetition of 
the stage game Nash equilibrium also represents a Nash equilibrium of the repeated 
game (Mailath and Samuelson, 2006, p.191). 
 
Strategy games are dominated by equilibrium analysis; however, in many cases, the 
assumptions that players immediately and unerringly identify and play an equilibrium 
strategy, thus the equilibrium being common knowledge (Aumann, 1976, pp.1236; 
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Milgrom, 1981, pp.219) to the players, may be questionable (Milgrom and Roberts, 
1991, p.82). Learning dynamics become even more important if players acquire new 
decision-relevant information in the course of play, which is typical if the same or a 
similar game is repeated several times. These learning dynamics may even have an 
impact on the equilibrium finally reached, if one is reached at all. The learning 
mechanism developed later in this paper is founded on ideas of fictitious play and 
smooth fictitious play. 
 
Fictitious play (Brown, 1951; Robinson, 1951) is one of the earliest learning rules, yet 
it was initially not proposed as a pure learning model but, rather, as an iterative 
method for computing Nash equilibria in zero-sum games. However, due to its 
intuitive update rule, it is commonly viewed as a simple learning model: every player 
is assumed to choose a best response to the assessed strategies of his opponents in 
every period of the game while he believes that his opponents are playing a mixed 
strategy, which is given by the empirical distribution of their past actions. Note that 
players know only their individual payoffs and are oblivious to the payoffs obtained or 
obtainable by their opponents (Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2009, pp.195). The 
essential idea behind this approach is that, at least asymptotically, past choices of 
opponents serve, to some extent, as a sound guide to their future behaviour 
(Fudenberg and Kreps, 1993, p.334). Smooth fictitious play was first analysed by 
Fudenberg and Kreps (1993): in this, players choose a perturbed version of their best 
response, but perturbation diminishes as the game progresses. The random utility 
model is one of the reasons for employing smooth fictitious play: players choose to 
randomise, even when they are not indifferent between their actions, as a means of 
protection from mistakes in their model of opponent’s play (Fudenberg and Levine, 
1998, p.117). For further models of learning (such as Bayesian learning, 
reinforcement learning and evolutionary learning), the interested reader is referred to 
Fudenberg and Levine (1998) and Shoham and Leyton-Brown (2009, pp.189). 
 
2.2 Discrete choice theory 
 
The fundamental hypothesis of discrete choice models is the assumption of individual 
utility maximisation. The decision maker is assumed to rate alternatives of his choice 
set by means of a particular utility function and will choose the one with the highest 
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utility. However, from an outside perspective, the utility of an alternative for a specific 
individual represents a random variable. Thus, utility  for alternative i is 
decomposed into a deterministic component  and a random component 
iU
iV i  
(McFadden, 1974, p.108): 
 
(1) i iU V i   
The random component of the utility function is introduced for various reasons; for 
example, incomplete measurability of the decision-relevant alternative attributes and 
limited rationality (Maier and Weiss, 1990, pp.98; Manski, 1977, p.229). Hence, from 
an external point of view, only evidence in terms of the probability of an alternative 
being the one with the highest utility is possible.  
 
Different concepts of discrete choice models differ, in terms of their specification of 
the random component. The most prominent member is the logit-model, with 
independently and identically distributed random components. The choice probability 
of an alternative i is computed as (McFadden, 1974, p.110): 
 
(2) 
i
j
U
i U
j
eP
e

   
The scale parameter   of the Gumbel distribution is usually fixed to a value of one, 
in order to enable identification of the model parameters of the utility function (Ben-
Akiva and Lerman, 1985, p.107). For our purpose, the logit-model is completely 
adequate and we will therefore refer to it later in the paper. However, for an 
introduction to the more sophisticated discrete choice models, the interested reader 
is referred to, for example, Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) and Train (2003). 
 
3. The model 
 
The modelling approach chosen in this paper represents a mixture of both game-
theoretic and decision-theoretic elements and this becomes especially apparent if we 
look at how competitors’ future actions are assessed and market entry and exit is 
modelled. Therefore, this section is subdivided in two parts: the first part describes, 
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for each period, the static decision problems of each class of players; i.e., airlines, 
airports and air passengers. The second part of this chapter deals with the modelling 
of market dynamics of the game and includes learning and assessing opponents’ 
strategies, market entry and exit and the equilibrium concept applied to the game. 
 
The model is modular in build, so that it can be customised to the particular problem 
at hand. For example, airports may be disregarded as players in the game if they are 
government owned or regulated and do not follow a truly competitive strategy. In this 
case, capacity is, in many cases, not a decision taken by the airports themselves and 
is thus fixed, from their point-of-view. Instead, capacity decisions may be based on 
political or environmental considerations of the government, rather than on a 
competitive airport strategy (Adler, 2005, p.64). Thus, airport capacities and airport 
charges represent fixed inputs for the decision process of each airline; however, the 
model is flexible enough to account for airports pursuing an individual competitive 
strategy. 
 
3.1 Player’s one-period decision problem 
 
Notation 
 
ac
atijmC  Other variable aircraft costs of airline a in period t on flight route ij for 
aircraft of type m 
P
atikljC  Other variable passenger costs of airline a in period t on flight route 
iklj 
ac
itamC  Other variable costs per aircraft of type m and airline a for airport i in 
period t 
rf
itC  Fixed costs of supplying runway capacity at airport i in period t 
rv
itC  Variable costs of supplying runway capacity at airport i in period t 
tf
itC  Fixed costs of supplying terminal capacity at airport i in period t 
tv
itC  Variable costs of supplying terminal capacity at airport i in period t 
atijklf  Flight frequency offered by airline a in period t on flight route iklj 
miF  Runway capacity consumption of an aircraft of type m at airport i 
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aiG  Set of airlines which take precedence over airline a at airport i 
i Interest rate 
atikljP  Airline’s a ticket price in period t for flight route iklj 
f
itP  Full passenger charges for departing passengers at airport i in period t 
t
itP  Transfer passenger charges for stopover passengers at airport i in 
period t 
l
itmP  Landing charges at airport i in period t for aircraft of type m 
atikljnP  Probability of n competitors being active on flight route iklj in 
period t, from the viewpoint of airline a 
atikljnq  Element n of the vector of service quality variables for flight route 
iklj of airline a in period t 
aijmS  Seat capacity of aircraft of type m of airline a, operating on flight leg ij 
tikljS  Number of competitors on flight route iklj in period t 
V  Set of feasible combinations of i, k, l and j 
 t tV S  Value of landing in state  tS
atikljx  Number of seats offered by airline a in period t on flight route iklj 
tx  Decision in period t 
atijmy  Number of aircraft of type m of airline a operating on flight leg ij in 
period t 
r
itz  Runway capacity supplied at airport i in period t 
t
itz  Terminal capacity supplied at airport i in period t 
atikljn  Coefficient n of inverse demand function  atikljP
f
it  Coefficient of inverse demand function fitP  
t
it  Coefficient of inverse demand function  titP
l
itm  Coefficient of inverse demand function  litmP
atikljn  Coefficient n of market entry/exit probability function (MEEP)  atikljnP
atiklj
btmopn  Homogeneity coefficient of the inverse demand function , 
measuring similarities between the particular flights on flight route 
atikljP
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iklj of airline a in period t and flights on flight routes mopn 
of airline b in period t 
atmopn
btikljf  Airline b’s increase of flight frequency on flight route iklj in period 
t, if airline a increases her number of seats offered on flight route 
mopn in period t by one unit 
atmopn
btikljx  Airline b’s increase of number of seats supplied on flight route iklj 
in period t, if airline a increases her number of seats offered on flight 
route mopn in period t by one unit 
 1
atmopn t
b t ikljx   Prediction of  in period t for period (t+1)  1atmopn b t ikljx 
atiklj  Profit of airline a in period t on flight route iklj 
atikljn  Profit of airline a in period t on flight route iklj with n airlines being 
active 
ltp
a  Long-term profit (LTP) of airline a 
stp
a  Short-term profit (STP) of airline a 
t  Profit in period t 
 
Airlines 
 
In this section, we present the one-period decision problem for each airline; i.e. one-
period profit-maximisation. In this, each airline views the values of the strategic 
decision variables of competing airlines and airports as input data for their decision 
process. 
 
(3)            
, , ,
, , ,
, ,
,al p f t t t t tat at at atiklj atiklj it kt lt atiklj
i k l j
i j j k k l
i k j l i l
Max x y P C P z P z P z x
    
         
(4)        
, ,
,
,
p f t t t
atikkj atikkj it kt atikkj
i k j
i k
k j i j
P C P z P z x
 
       
(5)      
,
p f t
atiijj atiijj it atiijj
i j
i j
P C P z x

      
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(6)   
, ,
ac l r
atijm jtm atijm
i j m
i j
C P z y

   
 
Subject to: 
 
(7)  
,
, ,
,atijkl atkijl atklij aijm atijm
k l m
i j k l
i l
x x x S y i
 
      j
j
 
(8) , , ;atijm atjimy y i j m i    
(9) 
 , ,
2 rmi atjim it
a G a j m
i j
F y z
 

   i  
(10) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
, , ,
, , ,
, ,
, , , ,
, ,
2
2
ai
ai ai
atkijl atkjil atikjl atklji
a G a k l j
i j j k k l
i k j l i l
t
atkiil atikkl atklli atiijj atjjii it
a G a k l a G a j d
i k k l i j
i l
x x x x
x x x x x z
 
    
   
  
    
      

  i  
(11) , , , , ,atijm atijkl
m
y f i k l j i j i k i l      
(12) , , , ,atijm atkijl
m
y f i k l j i j k   l  
(13) , , , , , ,atijm aklij
m
y f i k l j i j i k j k j l       
(14) 
0 , , , ,
0 , ,
atiklj
atijm
x i k l j
y N i j
 
   m  
Rows (3) to (6) describe the one-period objective function of each airline. If integer 
restrictions are computationally too expensive, they may be neglected by coarsening 
the time-scale of the model; for example, moving from a monthly to a yearly view, so 
that fractional numbers (in particular the number of flights) do not pose a serious 
problem. Strategic decision variables are the number of seats offered on each flight 
route and the number of flights operating on each flight leg. With regards to uniform 
model presentation, the number of seats offered is indexed redundant and 
independent of the number of stopovers by four lower subscript letters describing 
flight route structure. Passenger costs are subdivided into passenger charges paid by 
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the airline to the airport and other variable passenger costs. Like Adler and 
Berechman (2001, p.380), we have subdivided airport charges into passenger 
charges paid to the departure airport for each passenger carried and landing charges 
paid to the arrival airport, based on aircraft type and size. Passenger charges are 
further subdivided into full price, paid to the first departure airport, and transfer price, 
which is paid at each subsequent hub, if the flight route to the chosen destination of a 
passenger includes at least one stopover. This airport charges schedule is clearly 
arranged but also offers enough flexibility to include other relevant charges, such as 
handling, night and noise charges. The demand function and the inverse demand 
function , respectively, are defined for each particular flight route. (…) 
represents the independent variables of the inverse demand function, such as the 
number of seats offered, flight frequency, time of flight and number of stopovers, in 
addition to the number of seats and flights offered by competing airlines. Thus, row 
 aP 
(3) applies to flights with two stopovers, row (4) corresponds to flights with one 
stopover and row (5) relates to nonstop flights. Expanding the model to flights with 
more than two stopovers is straightforward; however, the majority of flights have, at 
most, two stopovers and thus explicitly including such flights only complicates 
presentation without adding anything substantially new. Row (6) describes the fixed 
costs of each flight, composed of aircraft operating costs and landing charges at the 
arriving airport. 
 
Rows (7) to (14) represent the constraints each airline has to comply with in their 
planning process. Constraint (7) ensures that aircraft capacity restrictions are fulfilled 
on each flight leg, whilst constraint (8) balances the number of aircrafts in both 
directions between two airports, in order to support subsequent tactical and 
operational network planning (Jacquemin, 2006, p.175). Constraint (9) limits the 
available runway capacity at each airport. The sigma sign includes airline a and all 
competing airlines that take precedence over airline a; for example, because of 
grandfather rules. Each aircraft uses the runway of an airport for arrival and 
departure, whilst  allows for different levels of runway capacity consumption, 
depending on aircraft type and airport. Constraint 
miF
(10) limits each airport’s terminal 
capacity available to each airline for flight routes with two, one and no stopovers. Like 
constraint (9), the sigma sign includes airline a and all competing airlines that take 
precedence over airline a. Transfer passengers use the terminal for arrival and 
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departure, whereas passengers emplaned and deplaned use the terminal only once. 
Rows (11) to (13) require the number of flights between two airports to be above the 
corresponding flight frequency of the corresponding inverse demand function. (14) 
describes the domain of the strategic decision variables. 
 
As we are looking at networks from a strategic and long-term point of view, no 
complicated airline pricing strategies are included (Adler, 2005, p.61). Different fare 
segments (for example, economy, business and first class) are not included in the 
model formulation presented above, but introducing different seat categories is 
straightforward and essentially the same as duplicating existing O-D relations and 
introducing a particular inverse demand function for each copy. However, for ease of 
presentation, we neglect different seat categories here. 
 
Airports 
 
In this section, we present the one-period decision problem of each airport pursuing a 
competitive strategy; i.e., one-period profit maximisation in this chapter. 
 
(15)     
, ,
,ap r t l acit it it itm itam atjim
a j m
Max z z P C y       
(16) 
        
      
   
, , ,
, , ,
, ,
, ,
,
,
,
t t f f
it it atkijl atkjil it it atikjl
a k l j
i j j k k l
i k j l i l
t t f f
it it atkiil it it atikkl
a k l
i k
k l i l
f f
it it atiijj
a j
i j
P C x x P C x
P C x P C x
P C x
    
 

     
     
  



 
 


 
(17) tf tv tit it itC C z    
(18) rf rv rit it itC C z   
Subject to: 
 
(19) 
, ,
2 rmi atjim it
a j m
i j
F z z

    
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(20) 
  
   
, , ,
, , ,
, ,
, , ,
, ,
2
2
atkijl atkjil atikjl atklji
a k l j
i j j k k l
i k j l i l
t
atkiil atikkl atklli atiijj atjjii i
a k l a j
i k k l i j
i l
x x x x
x x x x x
    
  
    
     

  z  
(21)  , 0r tit itz z 
Rows (15) to (18) describe the one-period objective function of each airport. An 
airport’s decision variables are terminal and runway capacity that is supplied. 
However, airports communicate their passenger and landing charges to airlines, 
which are dependent on the level of terminal and runway capacity at each airport. 
These charges are described by inverse demand functions with independent 
variables (…). For ease of presentation, passenger charges have been only 
subdivided into full and transfer without referring to, for example, destination type: 
however, including more details poses no difficulties. The same is true for landing 
charges, which are simply categorised by aircraft type. Row (15) specifies aircraft-
related revenues and costs, whereas row (16) describes passenger-related revenues 
and costs. Rows (17) and (18) specify the cost of supplying terminal and runway 
capacity: they are composed of a fixed-cost pool and a variable part, according to the 
level of capacity supplied. 
 
Rows (19) to (21) represent the constraints each airport has to fulfil. Constraint (19) 
ensures that the number of aircraft movements does not violate runway capacity 
restrictions of the airport, whilst constraint (20) requires the number of passengers 
handled at the airport to be below its maximum terminal capacity. Constraint (21) 
describes the domain of the strategic decision variables. 
 
Air passengers 
 
Passengers’ air travel demand is modelled for each combination of airline and flight 
route. The demand function approach in this paper is based on the full price demand 
model (De Vany, 1974, pp.77; Oum et al., 1995, p.841; Panzar, 1979, p.92) and the 
product characteristics approach by Lancaster (1966). The demand a carrier attracts 
on a specific flight route depends on the number of seats offered and quality of 
service provided and this also applies to flights that serve as a substitute; however, 
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the degree of substitution may vary, depending on the quality of service supplied. 
Passenger demand is influenced by many attributes that form the quality of service 
provided (e.g., Alamdari and Black, 1992; Hess et al., 2007; Bieger et al., 2007). 
These attributes can roughly be subdivided into the following categories: travel cost, 
travel time, number of (daily) connections, number of stops and comfort. The model 
approach chosen allows the capturing of competition with homogeneous products, in 
addition to the more general case of product differentiation. Likewise, Oum et al. 
(1995, pp.838) state that airlines are modelled as multiproduct firms, choosing the 
O-D destinations and flights routes they serve; however, including the network 
configuration of each airline affects the nature of interaction between the markets 
served. 
 
As airlines are modelled as Counot competitors and thus the number of flights and 
seats provided represent their strategic decision variables, we work directly with the 
inverse demand function, which we define as follows: 
 
(22) 1 2
, 2
atiklj
atiklj atiklj atiklj btmopn btmopn atikljn atikljn
b n
mopn V
P x   

     q   
The last sum in (22) is the weighted sum of the service quality attributes of a 
particular route, which describes the preferences of air passengers. The coefficient 
 serves as a measure of homogeneity and is therefore defined for values 
between zero and one. The closer the value approaches one, the more passengers 
view two flight routes as almost perfect substitutes. In turn, similarity between two 
flight routes depends on the Euclidean distance between their characteristics; thus, 
 is defined as: 
atiklj
btiklj
atiklj
btiklj
 
(23)  2
2
1
1
atiklj
btmopn
atikljn btmopnn atikljn
n
q q




    
To reduce computational costs, especially in large-scale applications with thousands 
of flight routes, only those flight routes with a  beyond some predefined value 
may be considered in 
atiklj
btiklj
(22). 
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(22) and (23) show that the price-setting behaviour of airlines on their operated flight 
routes is influenced by their own flights supplied on different routes, in addition to 
flights operated by competing carriers. The more air passengers perceive different 
flight routes as substitutable, the higher the pressure on prices. Thus, ticket prices on 
a particular flight route of an airline depend both on the quality of service provided 
and the quality of potential substitutes. 
 
3.2 Modelling market dynamics 
 
Empirical reaction function and learning dynamics 
 
Competitors’ responses to own actions are not assessed through introspection; i.e., 
by taking the role of each competitor, solving their optimisation problems (including 
all interdependencies between competitors), analytically deriving their best response 
function and inserting them into their own decision problem, which is then solved. 
Such an approach would, in a number of cases, be computationally intractable for 
problems of a modest size and, moreover, it assumes that players are perfect rational 
individuals with almost unlimited computing abilities. Thus, the approach adopted in 
this paper means a partial departure from assuming perfect rational individuals with 
unlimited computing abilities towards a behaviour based on observed actions of 
opponents: each airline directly assesses competitors’ reactions by means of a so-
called empirical reaction function (ERF) to approximate individual behaviour locally: 
 
(24)      1 1 ;0 ; ,atmopnbtiklj btiklj atmopnb t iklj a t mopnx Max x x x x b a mopn iklj V        
,
 
Rosenthal (1981, pp.93) suggests, in his paper, resorting to the paradigm of decision 
analysis and assessing each competitor’s response directly, instead of a complex 
game-theoretic analysis. However, Kreps and Wilson (1982, pp.276) observe the ad-
hoc assessment of competitors’ behaviour in the approach of Rosenthal, but we build 
on observed past behaviour: every competitor is assumed to have some initial 
conjecture about the reactions of his fellow competitors, which is then updated each 
period by exponential smoothing: 
 
(25)     11 1 ;atmopn t atmopn t atmopnbtiklj btikljb t ikljx x x b mopn iklj V          
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The parameter   is bound between zero and one: the more   approaches a value 
of one, the more recent observations have an influence on future conjectures. 
 
Exponential smoothing allows accounting for noise in the data, as atmopn btikljx  itself is 
a random observation (in a different context see Powell, 2007, pp.98) and the ERF is 
only a local approximation. An ERF based on exponential smoothing lends more 
weight to recent observations than past ones, as opposed to ‘pure’ fictitious play, 
which Milgrom and Roberts (1991, p.84) criticise because it puts equal weights on 
each observation, no matter how distant they are. More recent observations are often 
assumed be a better guide to future behaviour than distant observations. 
Furthermore, the exponential smoothing mechanism has a similar effect as smooth 
fictitious play (Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2009, p.210; Fudenberg and Levine, 
1998, pp.110) and accounts for the stochastic nature of opponents’ actual behaviour 
observed each period: here, randomisation serves as a means of protection from 
mistakes in one’s own model of opponent’s play. Moreover, in deriving an iterative 
updating procedure, Powell (2007, pp.181) demonstrates how stochastic gradients 
and exponential smoothing are related to each other: we wish to find a prediction 
1atmopn t
btikljx
  for period t that produces the smallest squared error between estimated 
marginal reactions of a competitor and his actual marginal reactions in period t, as 
shown in (26). 
 
(26)    21 112atmopn t atmopn t atmopnbtiklj btiklj btikljMin F x x x      
Therefore: 
 
(27)   1 1atmopn t atmopn t atmopnbtiklj btiklj btikljF x x x     
is called a stochastic gradient because atmopn btikljx  is a random observation. If we use 
a standard optimisation sequence to obtain an improved estimate , we 
obtain: 
 1
atmopn t
b t ikljx 
 
(28)    1 11atmopn t atmopn t atmopn t atmopnbtiklj btiklj btikljb t ikljx x x        x  
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However, this is the same as (25). Powell (2007, pp.183) describes several heuristics 
to find appropriate values for  . 
 
Flight frequency determines service quality and thus affects homogeneity between 
different flight routes in (23). Thus, competitors’ level of flight frequency on several 
flight routes influences the ticket price (22) an airline can realise on a particular flight 
route. Hence, the ERF concept is used to model competitors’ reactions with regard to 
flight frequency on a given flight route, subject to the number of seats airline a offers 
on a particular flight route (compare with (24)): 
 
(29)      1 1 ;0 ; ,atmopnbtiklj btiklj atmopnb t iklj a t mopnf Max f f x x b a mopn iklj V          
Individual conjectures, with regards to competitors’ flight frequency, are updated 
along the lines of (25) every period. Further service quality variables include time of 
flight, number of stopovers, comfort and ticket price. However, the first three 
attributes are implicitly included in the definition of seat capacity per flight route: if an 
airline decides on a particular seating capacity on a given flight route, they 
automatically decide on a particular level of time of flight, stopovers and comfort. 
Here, we neglect different types of aircraft that differ, in terms of time of flight and 
comfort on a particular flight route, as differences are usually small. Accounting for 
different models of aircraft causes no problems but complicates model presentation 
without adding anything substantially new. However, ticket price represents a 
dependent variable, as we model Cournot quantity competition.  
 
To conclude, from the point of a particular airline, their competitors are fully described 
by their ERFs. Competing airlines are subdivided into real airlines and virtual airlines; 
each of these may be further subdivided according to airline types: for example, full 
service network carrier and low-cost carrier. Real airlines are those that actually 
compete in a market, whereas virtual airlines do not currently compete in a market 
but may do so in the future. Real airlines are updated solely on the basis of their own 
observed behaviour, whereas virtual airlines are updated on the basis of the average 
observed behaviour of airlines of their type. 
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Demand for terminal and runway capacity represents derived demand from aircraft 
and passenger movements. These relationships are modelled on the basis of inverse 
demand functions  f tit itP z ,  and t tit itP z   l ritm itP z , which depend on the terminal and 
runway capacity supplied by an airport. However, air passengers’ inverse demand 
functions are based on a large data set, whereas airlines’ inverse demand functions 
depend on the profit-maximising behaviour of a rather small sample of airlines, which 
may differ substantially in their individual attributes. Moreover, the relevant set of 
airlines can vary over time, as new airlines enter the market and present airlines 
leave the market or undergo a change. Therefore, we employ the general structure of 
the aforementioned ERFs to model individual conjectures and the updating of each 
airport: 
 
(30) 
    
    
    
1 1
1 1
1 1
,
,
f f f t t
it it iti t i t
t t t t t
it it iti t i t
l l l r r
itm itm iti t m i t
P P z z
P P z z
P P z z



 
 
 
   
   
    m
 
The parameters fit , tit  and litm  are updated along the lines of (25) every period. 
Competition between airports is assumed to be weak, compared to competition 
between airlines; thus, airports are modelled as local monopolists. The principal 
reason for this assumption is the fixed location of airports and thus they have only a 
limited scope of actions. An increased distance between airports and binding 
capacity constraints further reduce the level of competition between airports. 
Nevertheless, limited competitive relations between airports may be included in the 
parameters fit , tit  and litm  of (30), to some degree, but airports are not modelled to 
carry out specific reaction functions like (25) and (29). 
 
Market entry/exit probability function 
 
Many models of learning, with regards to games, force players to be rather 
‘unsophisticated’; i.e., the players can only use information about past play. However, 
experienced players make use of information about the past, in addition to 
considering competitors’ information, payoffs and rationality (Milgrom and Roberts, 
1991, p.84). In this paper, past play is essentially reproduced in the updating 
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mechanism of the ERFs. In order to incorporate other factors, such as competitors’ 
information, payoffs and rationality, we introduce in this section the so-called market 
entry/exit probability function (MEEP), which describes the likelihood of a specific 
number of competitors being active within a market in future periods. Market entry 
and exit is modelled as a choice of ‘nature’ and thus a chance event from the point of 
view of the individual market actor; however, this choice depends, to some degree, 
on the behaviour of market actors. Typically, market profitability is raised in the 
search of relevant variables that have a major impact on the future number of 
participants in a market: the higher the market profits, the higher the probability that 
market actors stay in the market or that new entrants are attracted and vice-versa 
(the probability of staying in the market respectively decreases with diminishing 
profits and market actors leaving the market). However, average market profitability 
is not very operational, from the point of view of a single market actor, as opponents’ 
market profits and thus average market profits are usually not really observable to 
them; thus, as competitors’ market profits tend to be positively correlated, we choose 
the proxy variable ‘individual market profit’ as a guide to future market structure from 
the point of view of each individual competitor. With regards to MEEPs, we employ 
the ideas suggested by Rosenthal (1981, pp.93) to model the entry and exit of 
competitors as a chance event, where competitors are assumed to arrive at some 
subjective probability distribution, with regards to those events. Hence, every market 
actor estimates market-specific relationships between the probability of meeting a 
particular number of next period market participants and his own current market 
profits: 
 
(31) 
atikljn
atikljm
U
atikljn U
m
eP i
e
klj V    
(32)  1 2 21 ; 0atikljn atiklj atiklj atiklja t ikljnU iklj V          
The profits in (32) are assumed to result from rational and profit-maximising 
behaviour, in order to serve as an indicator for future market entry and exit. If they 
resulted from discretionary inefficiency and gross wasteful behaviour, they would not 
serve as a reasonable indicator. Typically, 1atiklj  decreases and 2atiklj  increases with 
rising index n, if the number of future market actors increases when market 
profitability increases. Thus, the cost of deterring entry or promoting exit differs by 
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airline characteristics, depending on whether a competitor is weak or strong, which is 
reflected in their parameters of (32). The optimal degree of entry deterrence and exit 
promotion is integrated into an airline’s profit maximising behaviour and thus depends 
on their individual characteristics. The general mechanism generating market entry 
and exit is common knowledge but the individual MEEPs that describe the actual 
estimated relationship between one’s own profits and the probability of market entry 
and exit is private to each competitor. 
 
Heuristic equilibrium concept 
 
Airports only base their strategies on inverse demand functions, such as (30). As 
they are assumed to be local monopolists, their actions do not vary in advance from 
period to period and thus lack inter-temporal interdependencies. Therefore, for 
airports, net present value maximisation is equivalent to maximising one-period profit. 
 
In the case of airlines, however, it is more complicated: net present value 
maximisation is not equivalent to maximising one-period profit, due to inter-temporal 
strategic interdependencies modelled by ERFs (24), (29) and MEEPs (31). Entry 
deterrence is such an example of inter-temporal strategic interdependencies. Thus, 
we mainly focus on the airline case, as the airport case is straightforward. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates a stochastic infinite horizon decision problem of a particular 
airline, where markets are defined by flight routes iklj. Different markets are 
connected by the passengers’ inverse demand functions (22) and ERFs (24), (29). 
Circles represent states  and describe a single period decision problem of an 
airline for period t in market iklj, given a fixed number n of competitors 
(including 
tikljS  n
(3) – (14), (24), (29) and (31)). Typically, only few airlines compete on a 
particular flight route and thus the maximum value of n is rather small. At the 
beginning of the planning cycle, airlines adjust their strategic variables for each 
period, in order to maximise their expected net present value: they consider any new 
information they may have learned up to the current period. Different states are 
distinguished by a time index t and a number n of competing airlines with certain 
decision-relevant characteristics. Airports are assumed to move prior to airlines in the 
game and their one-period decision problem is represented by (15) – (21) and (30). 
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Therefore, airlines are informed about airport capacities available, in addition to 
landing and passenger fees at each airport, prior to their decisions. Arrows between 
circles describe transition probabilities  (MEEPs) between states. Dotted arrows 
represent state probabilities for period 1 and arrows of the same colour add up to 
one. The decision-relevant characteristics of competing airlines are represented in 
each airline’s ERFs, whereas capacity supply, landing and passenger fees represent 
the decision-relevant characteristics of an airport, from the point of view of airlines. 
atikljnP
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Figure 1: Strategic decision problem of an airline 
 
A dynamic stochastic programme of a size to model real-world problems is typically 
manageable if it comprises only two to three periods (Schrage, 2006, p.355). The 
complexity of the decision problem depicted in Figure 1 grows quickly with each 
period added and is already barely manageable if the number of periods exceeds 
three for realistic sized problems. However, simply cutting off the problem after a 
certain number of periods is not an adequate solution, due to reputational effects: 
each airline tends to have an incentive to behave more aggressively in earlier 
periods, in order to encounter less competition in later periods and reap the rewards 
of such a strategy. If there is a last period, airlines have no more incentive to maintain 
their reputation beyond that period, which they then, possibly, ‘milk’. However, the 
model’s last period is, of course, not the last period of the real-world problem and 
thus the value of landing in a state with fewer competitors in the last period tends to 
be underrated (see (33)). This would cause no serious problems if we employed a 
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continuous planning model, where the planning horizon lies well beyond the next 
planning cycle. However, the problem structure typically does not allow the adding of 
too many periods and the adding of only a few periods does not really resolve this 
issue. Therefore, the purpose of this section is to find a reasonable approximation for 
the decision problem depicted in Figure 1. 
 
The background for our approach is Bellman’s equation (e.g., Powell, 2007, pp.48): 
 
(33)      * 1 11max , 1tt t t t t t txx S S x V Si  
       
tx  represents the decision in period t and  describes the current state in period t. tS
tx  is chosen to maximise the sum of the one-period contribution  ,t t t x S  and the 
discounted value of landing in state 1tS  , which is represented by  1 111 t tV Si   . 
Figure 2 and Figure 3 illustrate the modelling approach. We subsequently denote the 
one-period contribution of (33) as short-term profit (STP) and the discounted value of 
landing in state  of 1tS  (33) as long-term profit (LTP). 
 
One-period contribution of (33) is modelled as a two-period game, in order to allow 
for reputational effects between two periods. The discounted value of landing in a 
state in (33) is modelled as the Nash equilibrium of an infinitely repeated game with 
discounted payoffs. However, the stage game again comprises of two periods, in 
order to model reputation effects between two adjoining periods. The repetition of 
stage game Nash equilibrium in every period is also equal to a Nash equilibrium of 
the repeated game (Mailath and Samuelson, 2006, p.191). As a side constraint, we 
require the strategic decisions to be equal in both periods. This has no effect, in 
terms of the strategy being a Nash equilibrium, if the interest rate takes a value of 
zero. However, if the interest rate is greater than zero, this strategy is no longer a 
Nash equilibrium but only an approximation, which becomes worse with an 
increasing interest rate. In spite of this, we employ this approximation, as the interest 
rate is typically small and thus the bias of the approximation tends to be rather small 
also. 
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The STP decision problem consists of real airlines, where possible, and is filled up 
with virtual airlines as is necessary. The reason for this approach is that the STP 
decision problem predominantly models near-term competition between actual 
airlines, whilst the LTP decision problem consists only of virtual airlines: its purpose is 
to model the long-term strategic position in airline competition. To link the STP 
decision problem with the LTP decision problem, we require each airline’s decision in 
the last period of the STP decision problem (period 2) and the first period of the LTP 
decision problem (period t) to be identical, thus preventing reputation milking in the 
last period of the STP decision problem. 
 
# of 
competitors  
 
 Period 
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Figure 2: Modelling airlines’ short-term payoffs 
 
Therefore, the STP decision problem of an airline a is represented as: 
 
(34)   1 1 2 2
, ,
1,
1
stp
a a a a ikljn a ikljn a ikljm a ikljm
iklj V n m
Max x y P P
i
 

             
Subject to: (7) – (14) 
 
(35) 2 2a atx x t    
1a ikljnP  are initial probabilities of the different states in period 1 and correspond to the 
dotted arrows in Figure 2. Remember,  depend on the profits achievable in 
period 1 and thus on the number of competitors in that period. For clear arrangement, 
2a ikljmP
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we have disaggregated one-period profits of an airline by flight routes (iklj) compared 
to (3) – (6). Each airlines’ ERFs are included in atikljn  and, in a Nash equilibrium, 
each airline maximises (34), subject to the constraints (7) – (14) and (35). 
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Figure 3: Modelling airlines’ long-term payoffs 
 
The LTP decision problem of an airline a is defined as: 
 
(36)        1 12 , ,
1 1,
11
ltp
a a a atikljn atikljn a t ikljm a t ikljm
iklj V n m
Max x y P P
ii i
   

              
Subject to: (7) – (14) and (35) 
 
atikljnP  are initial probabilities of the different states in period t. They are initialised by 
some estimates; for example, on the basis of the STP decision problem, and they are 
updated during each new planning cycle, according to the observed frequencies of 
the actual number of competitors in each period through exponential smoothing (see 
(26) – (28)). In common with the STP decision problem,  depends on the 
profits achievable in period t and thus on the number of competitors in that period. 
Payoffs of period (t+1) are discounted to the present value of period t and then the 
present value of the infinite sum of stage game payoffs from period 3 to infinity is 
computed. 
 1a t ikljmP 
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The complete decision problem to approximate the net present value maximisation 
consists of the sum of (34) and (36), subject to (7) – (14) and (35) (at which (35) is 
eliminated by insertion). There are, essentially, only two different periods for which 
decisions are to be made, as we require decisions of period 2, t and (t+1) to be 
identical. This drastically reduces the number of strategic decision variables and thus 
model complexity, compared to a case with different decisions for each period in an 
infinity horizon decision problem (or, at least, a finite horizon decision problem with 
an ample number of periods). However, depending on the case, the STP decision 
problem can be extended to more than two periods, if the model remains 
manageable, and thus the accuracy of the approximation is increased. However, it is 
typically very expensive (computationally) to increase the number of periods of the 
STP decision problem so much so that the reputation milking problem sufficiently 
disappears and we can do without the LTP decision problem. However, the general 
approach does not change and the flow chart in figure 4 illustrates the complete 
model’s course of action. 
 
To obtain good initial starting values, the model is run through a number of periods; 
however, the results of the first few periods heavily depend on the starting values and 
therefore, should not be overestimated. The model may converge after a number of 
periods to a stable market structure, which we subsequently call a ‘long-term 
equilibrium’ as in our model players’ decisions of each period represent, by definition, 
a Nash equilibrium, given their information status at the beginning of each period. 
The iterative approach, which we have primarily chosen to model learning effects and 
the temporal development of air transport markets, is also employed as a method for 
searching for Nash equilibrium in static models of air transport markets (for example 
Adler, 2005, p.64; Evans et al., 2008, p.2; Evans and Schäfer, 2009, p.2; Hansen, 
1990, p.38). However, Adler (2005, p.64) and Hong and Harker (1992, p.317) note 
that such a long-term Nash equilibrium may not exist or that it is not unique, if one 
does exist. Sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium (Adler, 
2005, p.64) are: 
 
 The strategy set of each player is bounded, convex and closed. 
 The profit function for each player is concave, with respect to the player’s 
strategy set assuming fixed competitors’ strategies. 
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 All profit functions are continuous over the strategy sets of all players. 
 
Airlines’ aggregate 
demand >  
airport capacity? 
 Initialise: 
 Passengers’ inverse demand 
functions 
 Airlines’ inverse demand 
functions 
 ERFs 
 MEEPs 
 Initial state probabilities of STP 
and LTP decision problem 
t = t + 1 
Airports decide on their profit-
maximising supply of runway & 
terminal capacity (including charges) 
according to airlines’ inverse demand 
functions 
Based on airports’ decisions airlines 
decide on their supply of flights to 
maximise net present value  
Yes 
Allocate scarce airport capacity to 
airlines according to a predefined rule 
(for example grandfather rights, new 
entrants rules) 
Market structure in 
period t 
No 
 t = t + 1 
 Update airlines’ inverse 
demand functions, ERFs & 
initial state probabilities of 
STP and LTP decision 
problem based on observed 
behaviour in period t 
Period t = 0 
Period t 
Next planning cycle 
 
Figure 4: Model flow chart 
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Typically, the profit functions cannot be guaranteed to be concave. Adler (2005, p.64) 
and Hansen (1990, p.39) call situations in which the model cycles around two or 
more possible solutions without convergence or in which the majority of decision 
variables achieve convergence, with only a few remaining divergent, a ‘quasi-
equilibrium’. One reason for the non-existence of a stable equilibrium may be an 
empty core (Button and Nijkamp, 1998, pp.13; Button, 2003, pp.5; Gillen and 
Morrison, 2005, p.170). An allocation is said to be ‘in the core’ when there is no group 
of market participants within the economy that could be better off by trading amongst 
themselves; i.e., no further gains from trade are possible for any group or subgroup 
(Button, 2003, p.7). Occurrences that support an empty core and are of particular 
interest in this paper are (Button and Nijkamp, 1998, pp.21; Button, 2003, p.9): 
 
 The existence of fixed costs and a low variation in suppliers’ minimum average 
costs 
 Low elasticity of demand 
 Large capacity of a supplier, relative to market size 
 
However, as the model’s main objective is to describe market developments over 
time, the non-existence of such a long-term equilibrium does not limit the scope of 
the model. 
 
4. Summary and discussion 
 
In this paper, we have presented an approach to model competition in air transport 
markets, in which we focus on airlines, airports and air passengers. We assume that 
airlines and airports maximise their profits and air passengers maximise their utility 
and, compared to related models that mainly focus on what we call a ‘long-run 
equilibrium’, this model is primarily aimed at explaining temporal market 
developments and learning effects, in which a long-run equilibrium is not 
indispensable. The approach we have chosen is a mixture of decision theory and 
game theory: we introduce the concepts of a so-called empirical reaction function and 
market entry/exit probability function, in order to model opponents’ reactions on own 
actions and the market entry and exit of competitors. However, an essential element 
of this approach is that airlines and airports learn about the behaviour of individual 
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competitors and the market in general, over time, on the basis of observed past 
actions, which influences future actions. Airlines care about the number of future 
competitors in the market and thus maximise their net present value to account for 
the influence of their current strategic position in the competition on future profits. 
Airlines calculate the benefits of their own market entry, in addition to entry 
deterrence and market exit of competitors. However, these issues substantially 
increase model complexity and, therefore, a heuristic equilibrium concept is 
presented, in order to find a sound approximate model solution for each period. 
 
In the context of market entry and entry deterrence, Selten’s chain store paradox 
(Selten, 1978, pp.127) has received much attention: in a multi-period game, with 
perfect information about each other’s payoffs, entry deterrence is not a perfect 
equilibrium and thus not rational. The key factor driving this conclusion is that it is 
common knowledge (Aumann, 1976, pp.1236; Milgrom, 1981, pp.219) that 
accommodation is the best response to entry and vice-versa. Therefore, reputational 
effects play no role in this model (Milgrom and Roberts, 1982, pp.282). However, 
Kreps and Wilson (1981, p.226) note that the common knowledge assumption 
regarding the monopolist’s payoff is very strong in real-life contexts. 
 
The models of Kreps and Wilson (1982, pp.253) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982, 
pp.280) attempt to explain Selten’s chain-store paradox, by introducing incomplete 
information about the nature of the incumbent into the game. 
 
Kreps and Wilson introduce a small probability p that, at any given stage of the game, 
a predatory response is directly more profitable for the incumbent than sharing the 
market. Information about actual payoffs of the incumbent is incomplete from the 
point of view of an entrant, which is an important difference to Selten’s model. 
Probability p is updated each round, on the basis of observed behaviour. However, 
the results of the model depend on choosing the nature of p and thus the information 
of the entrants about the payoffs of the incumbent which is, to some degree, an 
ad-hoc assumption. 
 
In the Milgrom and Roberts model, there is incomplete information about the nature 
of the incumbent: There is, in each case, a small probability that the incumbent 
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always reacts aggressively and cooperatively, when market entry occurs. These two 
probabilities reflect the doubts that entrants have, regarding whether their modelling 
of the incumbent’s behaviour is correct. 
 
In our approach, each player’s incomplete information about the nature of his 
opponents is modelled by means of ERFs, which are updated each period on the 
basis of observed behaviour, and MEEPs. In the models of Kreps and Wilson and 
Milgrom and Roberts, the probability of entry deterrence by the incumbent depends 
on the entire history of the game and, once the incumbent has failed to prey, future 
preying has no effect and entry occurs. However, in this paper, whether market entry 
occurs or not in a particular period depends solely on the state and the decisions of 
the players of the previous period, rather than on the complete history. If cooperative 
behaviour has occurred in the past (maybe as a ‘mistake’, as players have only 
incomplete information and limited rationality), entry deterrence is still possible in the 
future. Here, players’ information structure is founded on observed past behaviour 
( ERFs) and econometric functions ( MEEPs). 
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